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Review of How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human, 
by Eduardo Kohn. Berkley: University of California Press, 2013.
In its essence, Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond 
the Human (2013) is a semiotic guide to thinking with the forest. By exploring the 
variety of semiotic activity in the Amazonian forests and villages and mediating a 
culture’s coexistence with different semiotic actors, the book reveals what happens 
to thinking if it is opened up to thinking with those with whom one does not share 
a common language. By peeling off the symbolic cover of language, layers of human 
communication are exposed which are shared with non-human beings. Although 
the book is an anthropological monograph, it takes the reader along to thinking with 
the characters of the book as if it were a piece of fiction. Yet it relies on the disci-
plines and theoretical underpinnings of anthropology and semiotics to discuss the 
formation and transformation of human and non-human selves. 
The subjects of Kohn’s anthropological research are the Runa, who live in 
Ecuador’s Upper Amazon. The lives of the Runa and their making sense of the world 
is deeply entangled with the animals (e.g., jaguars, peccaries, monkeys, coatis) and 
plants of the Amazonian forests, as well as with their domestic dogs, the spirits of 
the forests, and the white-mestizo world beyond their villages. The human subjects 
smoothly move from the dream world to the world of wakefulness. They model their 
relations with the spirits according to the social hierarchies of the everyday world 
and synchronize different times by foretelling future in their dreams and by preserv-
ing the colonial encounters of the past in the mythological presence, e.g., by using 
the formulas that their forefathers used in the 16th century for negotiations with 
the Spaniards when communicating now with the forest spirits (Kohn 2013: 184). 
Despite the changes of the body and the mind that a Runa individual undergoes 
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during his/her lifetime and even after that, all those different domains of reality that 
he/she enters have their own rules and boundaries, which the migrator has to follow.
Kohn mainly relies on two authors as his semiotic foundation: Charles Sanders 
Peirce and Terrence Deacon. On the one hand, both are relevant for Kohn’s attempt 
to move beyond the human in the description of semiotic phenomena. On the other 
hand, they help to retain distinctions between the semiotic subjects through differ-
ences in their semiotic abilities. Kohn rigorously unfolds different sides of Peirce’s 
thought. The topics that get their theoretical support from Peirce include the char-
acterization of mind as something which is capable of taking and laying aside habits 
(Kohn 2013: 62); the similarity of thinking (as an addressing of one’s future self) and 
intersubjective communication (Kohn 2013: 87); and the formation of the self in the 
future, which takes place through guessing and confirming or confuting interpreta-
tions (Kohn 2013: 206–208). Also Deacon’s ideas support several arguments of the 
book. However, it is his discussion of the mechanisms of learning which ground the 
transitions between different types of signs (Deacon 1997: 69–92) that serves as the 
focal point. As for anthropological references, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s works, 
especially those related to the “multinaturalism”2 of the Amazonian Indians, are 
highlighted. Somewhat unexpectedly also Claude Lévi-Strauss, whose name other-
wise occurs in the discussions of human-animal relations due to his attribution of a 
unidirectional relation between humans and other species,3 has found a place in this 
company. Kohn (2013: 176–177) addresses a different side of Lévi-Strauss’s thought, 
though – namely the one about “wild thinking” as something which conforms to the 
self-organisation of thought, once the latter is released from the obligation to yield 
results. Although “wild thinking” is dormant in our daily functional thinking, we 
still know from dreams or from certain types of poetic speech how thought can 
enter a kaleidoscope-like play of forms, when released from its obligation to be about 
something and reach definitve conclusions. Kohn also demonstrates how environ-
mental sounds and images easily merge with such a course of mental events. Besides, 
transition from one thought to another, which is based on forms, helps to get rid 
of established causal relations frozen into thought habits. At a certain point such 
habits of thought might become restrictive and deter the development of adequate 
interpretations of the surrounding. Kohn shows, for example, how the reproduc-
tion of animal or environmental sounds in onomatopoetic expressions might yield 
2 Multinaturalism captures the idea that all living beings as well as spiritual beings possess 
selves (culture), but as they are diff erent in their bodily constitution (nature), they see diff erent 
objects behind the shared meanings (see, e.g., Viveiros de Castro 2004).
3 Th e passage that is most oft en quoted from Lévi-Strauss in this connection derives from his 
book Totemism: “[...] natural species are chosen not because they are ’good to eat’ but because 
they are ’good to think’” (Lévi-Strauss 1991: 89).
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a sounder frame of meaning for environmental events than a symbolic interpreta-
tion which is tied to an already existing interpretative frame. A vivid example from 
How Forests Think concerns two women talking about the sounds of a spotwinged 
antbird, as one of them imitates the sounds of her movement in the forest together 
with the cries of the bird, while the other looks for the meaning of the cry, taking 
it as an omen (Kohn 2013: 174–176). An iconic interpretation that the first woman 
uses reveals the meanings of the bird itself – the iconically repeated sounds indicate 
indexically where and in what manner the bird is moving. The other woman over-
rides those sounds with the symbolic framework as if it were the only semiotic grid 
that renders the bird’s activity meaningful. Far too often, natural events simply serve 
as an impetus for building human systems of signification, the basement of which 
might be considerably stronger if the signs and interpretations animals themselves 
use were accounted for just as much. It is exactly due to the inclusion of the latter 
that How Forests Think can be read as a guide to thinking with the forest. 
Besides involving the abovementioned authors, who support the book’s cen-
tral arguments, How Forests Think also demonstrates a critical side. It questions 
sociocultural anthropology’s tendency to characterize human beings by their dis-
tinguishing attributes – language, culture, society and history – and to build upon 
these cognitive and theoretical tools that end up covering the whole human essence 
(Kohn 2013: 6). In Kohn’s account, instead of showing the essentially open character 
of human existence with its multiple origins and possibilities of interactions, such 
characterizations reduce and cancel out the variety of human, and also non-human, 
existence. Using one of the central terms of Kohn’s book – “iconicity” – we could 
call the approach towards which the author’s criticism is directed “misplaced iconic-
ity”. If humanity is equated with its language, history, society, these terms ultimately 
achieve an iconic status – they gain their factual status as they are taken as resem-
blances of reality itself. In such a case, iconic character is attributed to what is in fact 
symbolic – a relatively recent conventional understanding of what a human being is 
as an “effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge” (Foucault 
1971: 397). This is not to say that Kohn is calling for a strict separation of episte-
mology and ontology, which would set him within the very circles that he contests. 
Instead, by investigating how human interactions take place and are formed in the 
context of the semiotic activity of whole ecosystems, human symbolic thinking finds 
its origin in other modes of semiotic activity and stops being a mold that gives shape 
to the rest of reality. 
Kohn’s arguments are centred around what the author calls an “ecology of selves”. 
Here, “self ” is a relational term, also defined through the possession of a perspective. 
Thus, it shares the attributes of a “person” as described in several anthropological 
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studies in the past decades.4 Despite the apparent similitude of those definitions 
of “self ” or “person”, at closer scrutiny the relation that constitutes the self or the 
objects that define a perspective varies from culture to culture. The selves that Kohn 
(2013: 117) describes are defined through their ability to recognize the specific self-
hood of other beings: “In this ecology of selves, to remain selves, all selves must rec-
ognize the soul-stuff of the other souled selves that inhabit the cosmos”. Once such 
an ability is lost, the subject becomes soul blind – a term Kohn borrows from Stanley 
Cavell: while inattentive to the life activity of other beings, the subject can be easily 
treated as an object, and when turned into an object, it becomes further incapable 
of recognizing other subjects who are detrimental to the persistence of its own sub-
jectivity. Kohn (2013: 117) illustrates the idea with an example of a hunter whose 
hunting soul is stolen by a shaman and who thus cannot “differentiate animals from 
the environments in which they live”. The hunter has fallen into the trap of iconicity 
which hides the differences between entities.
On the other hand, Kohn also indicates how desubjectivization of the Other 
can be used as a strategy for easily capturing him/her, as is done while hunting. 
The treatment of someone as a subject or an object as dependent on the situation 
at hand (although not in the sense of depriving the other from its soul), echos Rane 
Willerslev’s (2007) similar conclusions about Yukaghir hunters and their treatment 
of the game animals. Another central statement that Kohn shares with Willerslev’s 
observations on the Yukaghirs is that a self, although capable of shifting the perspec-
tive, should never really lose its own identity – a person should keep his/her identity 
as a person, and, for example, not be trapped in the world of dogs. 
Given the recent “more-than-human” turn in several humanities disciplines 
ranging from semiotics to human geography and anthropology, the ground for the 
ideas presented in How Forests Think has already been prepared. Against this back-
ground, Kohn’s book gives a strong impetus for further generation of novel thinking 
about the entanglements of humans and non-humans.
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